Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

Carroll Freeman, Ann Marie Freeman, Sidney L.
Cohen, Kathleen Cohen, Plato G. Christapulos,
Stella A. Christapulos, E. M. Richardson, Kenneth
R. Poulsen, Virginia C. Poulsen, Benjamin N.
Meldrum, Grace D. Meldrum, Erwin F. Zeyer,
Wilma Grace Zeyer, Edward R. O'Hara, Eileen
O'Hara, Oscar Sorenson, M. Alice Sorenson, Earl E.
Loman, Helen M. Loman, Robert E. Themselves
and For Other Land Owners of Indian Rock
Subdivision
v.works
Leland
0. Gee, Vilate D. Gee, James F.
Follow
this and additional
at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law
Commons
Craner
and
Ida Craner : Respondents' Brief
Original
Brief submitted
Utah Supreme
Court to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Leonard J. Lewis; Attorneys for AppellantsRichard L. Bird, Jr.;
Attorney for Respondents CranerAlan H. Bishop; Attorney for Respondents Gee
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Freeman v. Gee, No. 10590 (Utah Supreme Court, 1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/40

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

L E D>

CARROLL FREEMAN, ANN MARIE Ci:EEJ
MAN. SIDNEY L. COHEN, KATIL11:EN
COHEN, PLATO G. CHRISTOPULOS, 0 I[
STELLA A. CHRISTOPULOS, E. M. RICH- ·
ARDSON, KENNETH R. POULSEN, VIRGIN I A C. POULSEN, BENJAMIN' -;.~'J;j; <
MELDRUM, GRACE D. MELDRUM, t'lt!. · "
WIN F. ZEYER, WILMA GRACE ZEYER,
EDWARD R. O'HARA, EILEEN O'HARA,
OSCAR SORENSON, M. ALICE SORENSON, EARLE. LOHMAN, HELEN M. LOMAN.ROBERT E. THAYER, and ELIZABETH THAYER, for themselves and for
other land owners of Indian Rock Subdivision,
Plaintifis-Appellants,
vs.
LELAND 0. GEE, VILATE D. GEE, JAMES
F. CRANER and IDA CRANER,
Defendants-Respondents.

l

r~ ~

1965

Case No.
10590

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Appeal from the Order of Dismissal of the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge

RICHARDS, BIRD & HART
Richard L. Bird, Jr.
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents Craner
ALAN H. BISHOP
201 State Exchange Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondents Gee

VAN COTT BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
Leonard J. Lewis
(.Keith Rooker
luilate 300, 141 E. First South
. It Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants

JAN 131967
LAW LIBRAQ

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services
and Technology
administered
P•INTIED
•V GALT Act,
LAltS
TIMES by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

...

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT ____________ 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------

2

ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------ 4
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE RESTRICTIVE
COVEN ANTS OF THE INDIAN ROCK
SPBDIVISION PERMIT CONTINUED
OCCUPANCY OF THE DUPLEXES UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. ____________ 4, 5
POINT II. NO TRIAL IS NECESSARY
TO INTERPRET THE RESTRICTIVE
COVEN ANTS. ---------------------------------------------------------- 17
POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR
IN REFUSINCf TO PERMIT NE\V COUNSEL TO CHANGE THE THEORY OF THE
ACTI 0 N. -------------------------------------------------------------------- 18
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------- 20
Cases and Secondary Authorities Cited
Carr, et al. v. Riley, et al., 198 Mass. 70, 84 N.E.

426 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11

Clar!" v . .Tammes, et al., 87 Hun. N. Y. 215, 33
N. Y. S. 1020 ---------------------------------------------------------- 11
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

Page
Daniels Gardens, Inc. v. Hilyard, 29 Del. Ch. 336,
49 A. 2d 721, 723, ( 1946) ·--···---···-··-·····-··········
s, g
Goodhue v. Cameron, 142 App. Div. 470, 127
N.Y.S. 120 --···-·······-···---·-··--··-··--·-··---·-·············
11.
Hooker v. Alexander, 129 Conn. 433, 29 A.2d 308 .. G
1·

f

Jones v. Park Lane for Convalescents, 384 Pa.

268

120 A.2d 535, 538 ( 1956) -····--··--·················
8: 11 .

Jordan v. Orr, 209 Ga. 161, 21 S.E.2d 206

6, 8, 11 •
( 1952) ·-··········-···········································-·
Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Ut. 2d 35, I
376 P.2d 940 ··················--········-·············-······
17.
Neptune Park Association v. Steinberg, 138 Conn.
357, 84 A.2d 687, 690 (1951) ····-·······-···········
8, 9

Ratkovich v. Randell Homes, Inc., 403 Pa. 63, 169

A. 2d 65 ( 1961) ---···--·-····--··-·-···--·····-··-·-············
8,

Simons v. Work of God Corporation, 36 Ill. App.

2d 199 183 N.E. 2d 729 (1962) -----·-···············

1'annelle v. Hayes, et al., 118 Mass. 339, 194 N.Y.S.

11 I
181 -·······--·······-······-·-···················-······---········
Walker v. Haslett, 44 Cal. App. 394, 186 P. 622.... 6 I

Secondary Authorities

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions & Restric8I
tions, Section 190 ·-··········-·-········--·····-·············
l

20 Am. J ur. 2d, Covenants, ConditionR & Restric· i
tions, Section 322 ············-···········-··················
11 I
155 A. L. R. 1007 at 1012 ········-···-··----·················
12, 13 I
Thompson on Real Property, Section 3167, P . 166 G
!

11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STArfE OF UTAH
CAHROLL FREEMAN, ANN MARIE FREEMAN, SIDNEY L. COHEN, KATHLEEN
COHEN, PLATO G. CHRISTOPULOS,
STELLA A. CHRISTOPULOS, E. l\II. RICHARJJSON, KENNETH R. POULSEN, VIRGIN I A C. POULSEN, BENJAMIN M.
MELDRUM, GRACE D. MELDRUM, E!.".WIN F. ZEYER, WILMA GRACE ZEYER,
EDWARD R. O'HARA. EILEEN 0 Hf'.I-{A,
OSCAR SORENSON, M. ALICE SORENSON, EARL E. LOHMAN, HELEN M. ~D
MAN,ROBERT E. THAYER, and ELIZABETH THAYER, for themselves and for
o~h.er land owners of Indian Rock SulJci1:
6
v1s10n,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, \
vs.

Case No.
10590

LELAND 0. GEE, VILATE D. GEE, JAMES
,:,
F CRANER and IDA CRANER,
Defendants-Responden'cs.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
Appellants state too broadly the ruling of the District Court and omit the particularity of the Order.
This final Order, entered after protracted preliminary
proceedings, arguments, attacks and defenses, issued
.\Larch !.l, 1966 (R. 126-128). The statement of appel-
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lants (Brief Page 2) is that the Restrictive Covenant,,
m question related only to the original constructio;
of homes in the subdivision.
1

The Court's first Pre-Trial Order (R. 66, 6i) di1·
tinguishes between construction covenants and ll~f
covenants and rules that Covenant III is a buildinoI
restriction and that Covenant I is primarily a building
restriction and should be interpreted as such particu·
larly since no affirmative injunction or demolition wa1
being sought.
The Court's final Order disposing of the case pre·
paratory to permitting an appeal holds that Covenant!.
when interpreted with other covenants of the buildini
restriction, pertains to matters of construction ano
physical qualities, whereas, Paragraphs V, VI, VIII
and IX of the Restrictive Covenants relate to use ol
buildings once they have been constructed (R. 12ti·.
127).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree generally with the statemen:
of facts in appellants' Brief (Pages 3 to 5). Theil!
statement again suggests that only Covenant I of the
Restrictive Covenants was before the Court wherea i
it is the position of respondents that all of the Restric·
tive Covenants must be read to interpret I.
1

1

1

Appellants refer to a stipulation that the plaint'.fi"
were not seeking relief by way of demolition by sayin,
2
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at Page 4 of their Brief that plaintiffs had asked to
be relieYed "of a statement apparently made to the
trial Court by their former counsel, Mr. Greenwood
~~

* *."

This statement appears under "Stipulations awl
Court's Rulings" in the first Pre-Trial Order where
the Court says: "And, as you are not seeking an affirmatiYe injunction which would require demolition, this
may be a building-restriction only and not a use-rest·iction, even though the California case seemed to inlerpret such words as a 'use-restriction' " ( R. 67).
The Amended Pre-Trial Order sets out plainly
that the action is one for damages, (R. 76 5 19) and
the plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Pre-Trial Order (R.
79-82) seeks no change from this ruling.
The lengthy Brief filed by former counsel for
plaintiffs does not complain of elimination of the demolition issue and argues in favor of a cause of action for
damages ( R. 90-108) .

1

The respondents Craner rented the upstairs of
' their home to their son and his wife from 1955 until
1!
February, 1964; the lower floor to one Verlin Scott
U'i
from 1\Iay 10, 1964 to January 17, 1965 and to .Mr.
1e1
and Mrs. Don F. Choquette from April 1, 1965 to
I'
October 22, 1965 and thereafter (R. 56, 67). An addic· i tional door giving access to the lower floor was installer1
Oetober 1, 1964 at a cost of $100.00 (R. 56).
1

I

f

1

It appears from the Amended Complaint and from
the Answer of respondents Gee to the Amended Com-
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1.

i

p amt that the Gee home was constructed immediate]) I
after November 20, 1961 and that upon completion of ,
construction, it was occupied as a duplex (R. 36 , 7: :

R. 45 ' 6).

I

Indian Rock Subdivision at all times material \11
the action and as of the 8th day of August, 1951, was I
a part of Salt Lake. City a~d subj~ct to the provisions I
of the Salt Lake City Zonmg Ordmance of which the ,
Court took judicial notice, (R. 77 ' 20) which fact was I
not referred to in the Court's final Order (R. 126·
127). See the discussion of this in the March 4th pro· :
ceedings ( R. 163) .
I

ARGUMENT
Point I. The trial Court correctly ruled that the
Rest~ictive ~ovenants of the ~ndian Rock Subdivision
permit contmued occupancy of duplexes under the facll
of this case.

:
\

I
'
i

Point II. No trial is necessary to interpret the :
Restrictive Covenants.

Point III. The Court did not err in refusing to i
permit new counsel to change the theory of the action. '
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECT
LY RULED THAT THE RESTRICTIVE car
EN ANTS OF THE INDIAN ROCK SUBDIYlSION PERMIT CONTINUED OCCUPANCY

4
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i

I

OF THE DUPLEXES UNDER THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE.
All of the Restrictive Covenants must be read
together in order to construe Covenant I.

It must be borne in mind also that under Covenant

III it is contemplated that during construction or prior
thereto there will be approval of plans, design and location which then provides "in any event, if no suit to
enjoin the erection of such building or the making of
such alterations has been commenced prior to the completion thereof, such approval will not be required
and this Covenant will be deemed to have been fully
complied with * * *." (R. 54).

I
\

I

Ii

The words "permitted to remain" in Covenant I
must therefore be read in connection with the remedy
provided in Covenant III with the result that the
building shall not "be permitted to remain" if action
is taken prior to the completion of construction.
The Court must also keep in mind that Covenants
r, \'I, YIII and IX relate specifically to use of the
property, distinguishing those from Covenants I, II,
III and IY which relate to the construction of improvements of the property.
The Craner home has been occupied as a duplex
from 1955 to the present time (Craner Deposition Page
2-3; Answers to Interrogatories 2 and 3, [R. 56-57]) ;
and the Gee home has been occupied as a duplex since
its completion in 1961 (Gee Deposition Page 19).

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

If there were nothing before the Court except tk
language quoted at Page 5 of appellants' Brief, then
respondents agree that many courts and perhaps tht
majority of courts have held that such language would
cover use of improvements on property as well as the
construction thereof. This is the conclusion of Thompson on Real Property, §3167, P. 166. An extensive
annotation at 14 A.L.R. 2d 1376, 1381, 1432 to 1436
is quite equivocal. Respondents submit that Jordan
v. Orr, 209 Ga. 161, 21 S.E. 2d 206 (1962), is a case
close to the facts of the case at bar, whereas appellants
do not cite any analogous case.

,

I

I
I

I
1'

1

':

I

In support of respondents' admission that Coye- ~
nant I standing alone could well be interpreted in fayor
of appellants, we note their case Walker v. Ha.Yleft, !
44 Cal. App. 394, 186 P. 622, where the words in the
covenant were: "no building or structure whatmr, I
other than a first class private residence * * * shall be \
erected, placed or permitted on said premises." The I
Court relied on the word "private" as proscribing a I
"double house" and the word "permitted" was what r
made this a use covenant.
1

1

1

•

1

Hooker v. Alexander, 129 Conn. 433, 29 A.2d 308,
provided that grantee "will not erect or maintain on the
premises any building except one one-family dwelling
house" and the Court found the word "maintain" to
relate to use. The same word "maintain" was the basi)
of the decision in Simons v. JVork of God Corporation.
36 Ill. App. 2d 199, 183 N.E.2d 729 (1962), which ii
6
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1

i
1

rited in the same manner and on the same basis in 20
Am . .J ur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions
qgo, P. 759, Note 7.
J

Because of the words "permitted to remain" in
CoYenant I it seems useless to embark upon consideration of the general proposition which appellants make
that some courts construe the words "construct" or
"erect" or "shall be first class residences" as relating to
construction as well as use whereas other courts give
the opposite interpretation.
Covenants I, II, Ill and IV relate generally to
construction and Covenants V, VI, VIII and IX relate
generally to use and therefore, the words "permitted
to remain" could well be construed as a permission to
remain during the process of construction only since
there is no proscription of such use in Covenants V,
n, Y III and IX. Respondents do not rely on this
argument since it would be conjectural. There must
be read in connection with Covenant I the more explieit Covenant III, which provides a specific procedure to be followed by lot owners and builders and
contemplates specific remedy by other lot owners in
the subdivision but limits that remedy to the period
during which there is construction. Plainly in this case
we are well past that period and that is why demolition
of the building was withdrawn as an issue by the original
counsel for plaintiffs under the stress of argument at
the Pre-Trials. Covenant I and the words "permitted
to remain" a ppettr as part of the construction words

7
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and must be interpreted in the framework of the c011 .
struction process in Covenant III and tlistinguishcil
from the use covenants.
I
r

I

20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Condition.y & Rcstrir·.
tionJS, § 190, reflects the argument upon which respond·
ents here rely. Section 189 points out a division of !ht
authorities on whether a restriction concerning con·
struction or building is applicable to later use of the 1
land and Section 190 reaffirms this by stating:
I
"Similarly, a covenant against the erection of I
a building other than a one-family or single•
dwelling house has been held to restrict the use·
of the building when erected to one-family pur· 1
poses.
"Other courts, however, take the view that a
restriction against the erection of a building
other than a dwelling hqose is a restriction onl1
as to the type of construction and not as to the
subsequent use of the structure, particular/.~
where another restriction etvpressly prohibits cer·
tain 1tses." (Emphasis added).
In support of this view, this treatise cites the annota·
tion at 14 A.L.R.2d, P. 1433, and the following cases:
Neptune Park Association v. Steinberg, 138 Conn.
357, 84 A.2d 687, 690 (1951); Daniels Gardens, Int.
v. Hilyard, 29 Del. Ch. 336, 49 A.2d 721, 723 (1946):
Jones v. Park Lane for Convalescents, 384 Pa. 268, 12ll [
1
A.2d 535, 538 (1956): .Jordan v. Orr, 209 Ga. 161, 7!
S.E.2d 206 ( 1952) ; and Ratkovich v. Randell Homes
Inc., 403 Pa. 63, 169 A.2d 65 (1961).
1

8
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Ju Neptune Park, supra, the use of defendant's
frnirteen room house as a common living place for familicc; ''as held not a violation of a zoning ordinance limiting use to single family dwellings or a restrictive covenant against erecting buildings except dwelling houses.
In reaching its decision, the Court stated:

"That it was the intent of the parties to make
this covenant apply only to the nature of the
structure to be erected on the land and not to
limit the use of it to occupancy by a single family
is made abundantly clear by the fact that there
is another covenant in the deed which does control the use of the property. We refer to the
covenant that 'no public hotel, Pl!blic bathing
house or club house, shop, store, saloon or other
place of business shall be erected or maintained
on the lot here conveyed.' This covenant does
prohibit maintenance of the structures named
as well as their erection. It prohibits uses which
might otherwise be made of buildings which
structurally were in the form of dwelling houses.
If it had been the intent of the parties to prohibit
the use of any dwelling house erected within the
development by more than one family, they would
naturally have so specified in this covenant in
connection with the prohibition of hotels."

Daniels Gardens, Inc. v. Hilyard, supra, involved
a situation where the plaintiff owned all of a housing
derelopment of 350 dwellings, many of which had been
sohl and where two buyers had converted a living room
into a delicatessen and grocery store, and into a pickup
station for dry cleaning and laundr~', respectively. A
single rlecd covered the entire tract and each lot therein

9
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and contained two restrictions pertinent here and whicli
were considered by the Court:
"1. All lots * * * shall be known and describe1I
as residential lots * * * . No structure shall b.
erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain
on any residential building plot other than one
single family dwelling * * *."

"4. No noxious or offensive trade or activiti
shall be carried on upon any lot nor shall all\:·
thing be done thereon which may be or beco1~t
an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood:
In advising a Decree of Dismissal the Court considereil
the contentions of the parties much as they are beini
advanced in the case at bar, and with language almosi
identical with our Covenants I and V, and noted that
rules of strict construction apply and that words wilt
be given their ordinary meanings, concluding:
"As the words used in the first restriction art
generally understood today, the restriction deah
only with the type of structure and not with tli:
use of such structure. * * *
"Another reason exists which in part bulwarb
the conclusion I have reached with respect to th::
first restriction. The fourth restriction explicitlr.
enumerates certain uses of the lots which art~
prohibited. If the first restriction is to apply tn
use as well as the character of the structure, thet
what possible function will certain language ol
the fourth restriction dealing with off ensiw trad
serve?"
The Court cited, as containing construction covenanb
and use covenants as distinguished from each other tlir

10
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following cases: Carr, et al. v. Riley, et al., 198 Mass.
70. 8-J< N.E. 426; Clark v .Jammes, et al., 87 Hun. N.Y.
215, :3:3 N.Y.S. 1020; Goodhue v. Cameron, 142 App.
Di''· 470, 127 N.Y.S. 120; Tannelle v. Hayes, et al.,
118 lHass. 339, 194 N.Y.S. 181, and also 155 A.L.R.
1007, 1012.

In Jones v. Park Lane for Convalescents, supra,
the Court made this distinction between building covenants and use covenants at Page 530 of 120 A.2d:
"A building restriction and a use restriction
are wholly independent of one another, and, in
Yiew of the legal principles above stated, the
one is not to be extended so as to include the other
unless the intention so to do is expressly and
plainly stated; to doubt is to deny enforcement."
This language was with reference to what the Court
held to be a building restriction in the following language:

" * * * shall be used only for the purpose of
erecting thereon prinvate dwellings * * *."

i

1, :

In Jordan v. Orr, supra, the plaintiff had been
non-suited following trial by the Georgia District Court.
'l'he facts were that the defendant had made a basement
room into a kitchen and had then rented three rooms
and bath includiug the kitchen so that there were two
entirely separate families in the dwelling. All deeds in
the subdivision contained the same eleven restrictions
of which the opinion quotes four. Two of these are as
follows :

11
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" (I) Said property shall be used onlr f111
residential purposes with the un~erstanding th I
110 duplex or apartment house is to be erectt:
thereon, and shall not he used for cemetery, ]i11,
pital, sanitarium, or any business purpose<
" ( 3) No use to be made of said propertr. 11:
any part thereof, which would constitute a llili
sance or injure the value of any of the nei(rhhor·
ing lots."
b
Restriction ( 5) dealt with cost of the residences to ik
constructed and Restriction (I I) ga re all owners~
right to enforce compliance with the restrictive conl.
nan ts.
The Court held that installation of the kitchen m•j
not such a structural change as to make the house ::
duplex since it had not been one before. It held that thri
first part of Restriction (I) applies to building anri:
the latter part to use saying:
Ii

"Had the subdivider intended that eac11 resi·
dence was to be used by only one family, tl11 1
could have been made clear by so stating in thn1
part of the covenant dealing with the use of tl1
property."
1

1

And held that this covenant was not violated by occupy·
ing a building as a residence and renting out a portion
to another family.

A similar rule is indicated by the summary

statf·

ment in I55 A.L.R. 1007 at 10I2 as follows:
"In some cases where a portion of the coyernin
restricted the 'erection' of structures, the court

12
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have held that the use was not to be considered
as also restricted, where the covenant elsewhere
enumerated specific business or occupations which
should not be permitted qn the premises, and the
use complained of was not one of those so excluded." Citing several cases.
Respondents ask the Court to interpret the Indian
Rock Subdivision Restrictive Covenants in the light
of the foregoing principles, giving strict construction
to the coyenants and the language thereof.
Covenants I, II, III and IV seem plainly to relate
to construction matters, Covenant Ill relating to approval of plans and objections to plans and suits to
enjoin "the erection of such building or the making
of such alterations" and providing that if no suit to
enjoin is commenced prior to the completion of the
structure "such approval will not be required and this
Covenant will be deemed to have been fully complied
with."
Covenants V, VI, VIII and IX relate to use of
the property and Covenant VII relates to moving a
structure onto one of the lots. No issue is raised on this
record under Covenants V, VIII and IX and Covenant
\'II is not involved. Covenant VI also relates to use
and requires more careful consideration. Covenant VI
refers to use of basements which are apparently included
as one of the possible "outbuildings" and use of a basement "as a residence temporarily or permanently" is
prohibited. Appellants have not argued that Covenant
YI gives them a remedy; but the Court may inquire
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into that possibility which seems to respondents tc 1
appellants' strongest argument.
'
J

The Statement of Facts refers to the houses
respondents as each having a "walk-out basement floor
and then provides that each floor is independent],
equipped as a residence and at Page 4 the Statenm
says that the respondents have rented out the "basenm
floors."
1

In the Interrogatories submitted by the plaintin
to the defendants Craner, the lower unit of the Cralli
home was referred to as "the lower floor of your prern
ises" and the "lower apartment" in the Interrogaton1
1, 3 and 4 (R. 56-57).
In the James F. Craner deposition the referem
is to "upstairs'', and "downstairs", Page 2 and 3 an
also to the "lower portion" Page 3 and 4. One questio
asked about reference in the building permit to "an
of the basement rooms or basement area as being coc
vertible into rooms under the permit" which Mr. Cram
answered "I don't remember."
In the Leland 0. Gee deposition the reference.
to the "lower element" (Page 15).
In his deposition, Earl R. Belnap, the buildt
of the Gee home refers to the lower floor as a baseme
at Pages 8, 9, 14 (where it is also referred to as tl
lower floor), 21, 23, (where it is also referred to i
downstairs). At Page 30, this question was put to JI! r
1

'

1

1

Belnap:
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,
1

''.Q. As a matter offact, a good many of these
spht-level houses that are one family dwellings
look exactly like this, isn't that so?"
and it was answered:
"A. Oh, it could be.
"Q. It's pretty hard to tell from the outside
whether they're a duplex or a one-family dwelling, isn't it?

"A. Yes, that's why the neighbors shouldn't
be complaining."
And in all of the depositions the buildings are ref erred
to as duplexes.
Mrs. Vilate B. Gee in her deposition referred to the
lower floor as "downstairs" (Page 15 and 25).
Therefore, it fairly appears that the two homes of
respondents are two-level homes, appearing similar to
other homes in the subdivision which are also two-level
homes where neither level is below ground, except that
at the back end or upper end, the lower floor terminates
in the hill with no indication as to whether the upper
floor so terminates in the homes of respondents or any
of the other homes in the subdivision.

The covenant seems to be directed at a custom
with some people to construct a basement with a temt!1, porary roof on it and dwell in that basement until the
··: home can be completed, which is a sort of sub-standard
)I residence in a high class subdivision. The covenant is
susceptible of the interpretation also that an undesir-

i\,

e1
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abl~ bas~ment or a hdow ground basement should"" I

be mhab1ted as a residence. Nothing in Covenant \[
refers to apartments or self-contained units in hai.
ments. It would therefore appear that when the 011 1
portion of a house that exists is the basement, it ,
contrary to the covenant to use that basement for re1,,
dential purposes, as though it were a tent, trailer, shac!
or garage or "other outbuilding". Exhibit I of t!ii.
Leland Gee deposition is a photograph of the fron1
of the Gee home and should be produced for the beneti:
of the Court.

1

1

In summary the respondents submit that the issw
of demolition was eliminated as a concession to propt. 1
interpretation of the covenants. Construction of a du
plex is proscribed by Covenant I but is approved h1'
inaction under Covenant III. Use of the complett:,
building must be measured by Covenants Y, YI, Ylll'
and IX, none of which applies. Had the preparer 11
the covenants desired to prohibit use of buildiugs
duplexes Covenant VI should have been expanded tr
cover such use whether the double units be side by si1L
front and back, or upper and lower. The reference t''i
"basements" along with garages and outbuildings col!'.
templates a basement unit without a superstructurr !
since otherwise lower levels of two-level homes coulii i
not be used for residential purposes either as self-c1n1·.
tanied units or as part of larger units.
i
1

This gives meaning to all the covenants and rec0i
nizes the logical treatment of constructoin, procedur
(Covenant III) and use of the property and buildinc
16
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l

1

i

POINT II. NO TRIAL IS NECESSARY TO
IXTERPRET THE RESTRICTIVE COYEXANTS.
Appellants contend that a trial of the case is needed
as an aid in interpreting the Restrictive Covenants,
citing Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Ut.
Zd 35, 376 P.2d 940. That case involved a controversy
between parties to a restrictive covenant and states
that the surrounding circumstances may be received in
eridence. Here, all of the respondents were subsequent
purchasers of the lots and took no part in any negotiations leading up to the preparation of the covenant.
"In an action to enfor~e a restrictive covenant,
evidence of the intent of the parties with regard
to the creation and extent of the restriction is
limited to the instrument itself, unless the meaning of the language used is uncertain or ambiguous, in which case the surrounding circumstances
may also be taken into consideration." 20 Am.

J ur.

§322.

~,

Covenants, Conditions &

Restriction.~,

The evidentiary circumstances indicated there, are
whether similar restrictions were inserted in other deeds,
whether there were buildings at the time, abstracts of
title, and similar things. These matters are all before
the Court in this action in the form of exhibits which
include plat of the subdivision with its date, the dates
of acquisition of the lots by the various parties involved,
depositions of the defendants, the deeds by which the
defendants took title, and the Salt Lake City Zoning
Clrrliuarn:e which antedated the Restrictive Covenants.
17
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The Court must first determine whether it regard,
the Covenants as ambiguous or uncertain, and if ~ 1 _
it should then determine whether the exhibits and tli·
depositions before the Court are sufficient to supph
the needed circumstances to assist in interpreting fa
covenants.
At Page 15 of their Brief, appellants state tlrnt
it is the respondents' view that the Covenants are am·
biguous as to whether they restrict use as well as con
struction. This is not the view of respondents. It 11
our view that the Covenants must be strictly construe1i
and that as so interpreted they are not ambiguous a111I
that the surrounding circumstances need not be delrei
into by the Court.
At Page 13 of appellants' Brief it is stated th:ti
"Plaintiffs have invested in their dwelling sites a111I
improvements in reliance upon covenants providing for
restriction to single family occupancy." The only fart,
in evidence belie this statement. The Affidavit in Sup·
port of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgmew
shows that most of the plaintiffs obtained deeds to thcr
property after the Craners and the construction r,;
their home for two family occupancy (R. 53).
It is doubtful whether a trial would shed furthe:
light on the surrounding circumstances.
POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT Elli:
IN REFUSING TO PERMIT NE'V COUNSEL
TO CHANGE THE THEORY OF THE ,\l
TION.
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At Page 6 of their Brief, appellants misstate the
position of respondents. Respondents do not admit
that plaintiffs have any remedy at the present time to
haw either of the houses demolished or altered. Our
position is not so narrow as to contend that someh°''.
the plaintiffs have lost a remedy to have the buildings
demolished. The plaintiffs' former counsel were convinced that under the Restrictive Covenants they had
no effective cause of action for demolition of the buildings, and therefore at Pre-Trial withdrew that as an
issue. The position of defendants on this matter is that
there is no basis for relief for demolition of the buildings under the Restrictive Covenants. Under Covenant
III this remedy was available prior to the construction
of the house, when the plans were filed and open to
view, and during the course of construction and not
thereafter. Secondly, plaintiffs desired no issue on this
partly because they believed their cause of action was
deficient and partly also because they really were not
seeking to change the houses of defendants but only
the use of those houses. And thirdly, since plaintiffs
acting through their counsel went through the PreTrial procedure without making an issue on this point
and specifically advised the Court that they did not
desire this as an issue, there is no occasion at the present
time to change this commitment.
Once the Pre-Trial Order has been made, the modification of it is for the discretion of the Court. There
is no obligation of the Court to permit new counsel to
change the position of the parties after there has been
full argument.
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I

The Amended Complaint plainly seeks relief J,;
demolition or alteration of the houses of defendant,
At Pre-Trial conferences it is appropriate to limit tht
issues of fact and law (Rule 16 Utah Rules of Ciril
Procedure), particularly when there is a Motion for I'
Summary Judgment as was the case here. Counsel were ,
free to make a record on this point and presene it for
this Court on appeal had they desired to do so. Present
counsel suggests that former counsel were derelict i11
abandoning the issue. However, the parties are bou111I
by actions of their counsel and as the Court commente1i
in the proceedings here on March 4, 1966, the issrn
of demolition was withdrawn because former counsel
believed they could not prevail on it under the Con
nants and that the case had been thoroughly explored
by former counsel and the law does not favor the shift·
ing of lawyers to get a new chance at old questions arnl
noted also that other persons had intervened in belrnlf
of the plaintiffs which the Court did not desire to en·
courage (R. 157 to 158).
I

CONCLUSION
The trial Court properly limited the issues in tht
case through the Pre-Trial procedure and made a soun1l
interpretation of the Restrictive Covenants as limitini .
duplexes at the construction stage.
1

There is no need for a trial in the case as the cir ·
cumstances surrounding the execution of the Covenant·
were before the Court bv Answers to Interrogatoriei.
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depositions of the parties, and exhibits offered at the
Pre-Trial.
There was no artifice or misunderstanding in elimination of the demolition issue and no obvious merit in
it under the facts of this case.
The Order of the District Court dismissing the
Complaint should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD AND HART
By Richard L. Bird, Jr.
Attorneys for Respondents Craner
716 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
ALAN H. BISHOP
Attorney for Respondents Gee
201 State Exchange Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

I,
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